Auction Theory

Auction Theory is the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions.

The book develops the main concepts of auction theory from scratch in a self-contained and theoretically rigorous manner.

It explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information through detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory.

This book complements its superb presentation of auction theory with clear and concise proofs of all results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization.

It provides discussions on auction-related subjects, including private value auctions; the Revenue Equivalence Principle; auctions with interdependent values; the Revenue Ranking (Linkage) Principle; mechanism design with interdependent values; bidding rings; multiple object auctions; equilibrium and efficiency with private values; and nonidentical objects.

This book is essential reading for graduate students taking courses on auction theory, the economics of information, or the economics of incentives, as well as for any serious student of auctions.

It will also appeal to professional economists or business analysts working in contract theory, experimental economics, industrial organization, and microeconomic theory.